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fore, as in the case of interspousal immunity, the statute should
act only as a procedural bar.
Cary G. deBessonet
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - STATE TAXATION OF
GROSS RECEIPTS
General Motors (GM), a Delaware corporation, manufac-
tured automobiles and parts entirely outside the State of Wash-
ington and sold them at wholesale to dealers within the state.
The corporation's business was conducted through the Chevrolet,
Pontiac, and Oldsmobile automotive divisions and GM Parts
division. These divisions, although not separately incorporated,
operated independently of each other. All the Washington sales
business of the automotive divisions was conducted under the
general supervision of the western "zone offices" located at
Portland, Oregon. In the case of the Pontiac and Oldsmobile
divisions, the instate Washington Sales organization consisted
of representatives ("district managers") who provided the direct
contact with the dealers. Each district manager participated
in the selection of dealers in his district and assisted the dealers
in working out their sales programs. No offices were main-
tained for the district managers; each one worked out of his own
home and made frequent visits to the dealers in his district.
The Chevrolet sales organization was similar except that a
"branch office" was maintained at Seattle out of which a
majority of the Chevrolet representatives operated: this office
was also under the Portland zone office. All orders for auto-
mobiles were sent directly to the Portland offices where they
were accepted for shipment f.o.b. the factories, none of which
were in Oregon or Washington. The General Motors Parts
Division supplied dealers with parts of Chevrolet, Pontiac, and
Oldsmobile automobiles. For this purpose, warehouses were
maintained in iSeattle and Portland, the more commonly used
parts being kept on hand at the Seattle warehouse. No parts
division representatives visited dealers.
The State of Washington imposed a gross receipts tax "for
the act or privilege of engaging in business activities" within
the state.' Among the businesses taxed were manufacturing and
1. WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. 82.04.220 (1962): "There is levied and shall be
collected from every person a tax for the act or privilege of engaging in business
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selling at wholesale; the tax was one-quarter of one percent of
the gross proceeds. To prevent the tax from pyramiding on
Washington businesses, it was provided that a Washington busi-
ness engaged in both manufacturing and selling at wholesale
should be exempt from the manufacturer's tax to the extent
that his products were subject to the wholesaler's tax.2
The state tax authorities asserted that GM was liable for
the wholesaler's tax (computed without apportionment) on all
sales of cars and parts to Washington dealers. Their sales fell
into the following categories:
(1) Sales of cars to dealers serviced by representatives
working out of their homes.
(2) Sales of cars (Chevrolet) to dealers serviced by re-
presentatives working out of the Seattle branch office.
(3) iSales of parts from the Portland warehouse.
(4) Sales of parts from the Seattle warehouse.
activities. Such tax shall be measured by the application of rates against value
of products, gross proceeds of sales, or gross income of the business, as the case
may be.
Id. 82.04.240: "Upon every person ... engaging within this state in business
as a manufacturer; as to such persons the amount of the tax with respect to
such business shall be equal to the value of the products, including by-products,
manufactured, multiplied by the rate of one quarter of one percent.
"The measure of the tax is the value of the products, including by-products,
so manufactured regardless of the place of sale or the fact that deliveries may
be made to points outside the state.
Id. 82.04.270: "(1) Upon every person ... engaging within this state in the
business of making sales at wholesale; as to such persons the amount of tax with
respect to such business shall be equal to the gross proceeds of sales of such
business multiplied by the rate of one-quarter of one percent.
Id. 82.04.060: "'Sale at wholesale' or 'wholesale sale' means any sale of
tangible personal property which is not a sale at retail and means any charge
made for labor and services rendered for persons who are not consumers, in
respect to real or personal property, if such charge is expressly defined as a retail
sale by ROW 82.04.050 when rendered to or for consumers . ..."
Id. 82.04.070: " 'gross proceeds of sales' means the value proceeding or ac-
cruing from the sale of tangible personal property and/or for services rendered,
without any deduction on account of the cost of property sold, the cost of materials
used, labor costs, interest, discount paid, delivery costs, taxes, or any other ex-
pense whatsoever paid or accrued and without any deduction on account of
losses."
2. Id. 82.04.440: "Every person engaged in activities which are within the
purview of the provisions of two or more of sections ROW 82.04.230-82.04.290.
inclusive, shall be taxable under each paragraph applicable to the activities en-
gaged in: Provided, That persons taxable under ROW 82.04.250 or 82.04.270 shall
not be taxable under ROW 82.04.230, 82.04.240, or subsection (2) or (3) of ROW
82.040.260 with respect to extracting or manufacturing of the products so sold,
and that persons taxable under ROW 82.04.240 shall not be taxable under ROW
82.04.230 ....
: The Washington Superior Court held that the presence of
a branch office in the state rendered some of the transactions
of .the Chevrolet and parts divisions subject to the tax, but,
as to the remainder, held that the application of the tax statute
would be repugnant to the commerce and due process clauses of
the United States Constitution. On appeal, the Supreme Court
of Washington reversed, holding that all of the appellant's
transactions were subject to the tax on the ground that the
tax bore a reasonable relation to the corporation's activities
within the state.8 Upon appeal, four Justices dissenting, the
United States Supreme Court affirmed. Held, Washington tax
levied without apportionment on gross receipts from wholesale
sales to Washington dealers of motor vehicles, parts, and ac-
cesories manufactured outside Washington by corporate tax-
payer bore a- reasonable relation to taxpayer's activities in
Washington, so that the tax did not offend the commerce and
due process clauses of the United States Constitution. General
Motors v. State of Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964).
State taxation of interstate commerce is an area of law
broad in scope and difficult in interpretation. Discussion here
is limited to the Supreme Court's treatment of gross receipts,
sales, and use taxes because these taxes directly affect the price
of goods and, when applied to an interstate business, may affect
its competitive position.
The cases in this area have dealt principally with the restric-
tions upon state action imposed by the commerce clause. But
in dealing with these interstate commerce problems, the Supreme
Court has not been able to separate completely interstate com-
merce problems from due process problems. To understand
the decision in the present case, it will be necessary to discuss
how the Court has handled both the commerce and due process
clauses in cases involving state taxation of gross receipts, sales,
and use.
The purpose of the commerce clause is to promote free trade
among the states. To effectuate this purpose the Constitution
granted Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce.'
Nevertheless, the states in the exercise of their legitimate police,
tax, and general regulatory powers have affected interstate corn-
3. General Motors v. State, 60 Wash. 2d 862, 376 P.2d 843 (1962).
4. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9-Wheat.)..1 (1824).
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merce. Since Congress has never attempted to resolve the con-
flicts between the exercise of these state powers and the free
flow of interstate commerce,5 the task has fallen upon the
courts to determine when the exercise of state power has inter-
fered with or burdened interstate commerce.
The Court first approached the problem in terms of whether
a particular tax was a direct or an indirect burden upon inter-
state commerce. Only indirect burdens were considered consti-
tutionally permissible. Under this approach, gross receipts
taxes were invalidated by the courts as placing a direct burden
on interstate commerce. 6 Following the same criterion other
taxes such as a net income tax levied against an interstate cor-
poration were upheld as being indirect burdens. 7
More recently the Court has shifted from the "direct-in-
direct" approach, without completely abandoning it,8 and has
begun talking in terms of "multiple burdens."9  Under this
approach the Court determines whether there is a possibility
that more than one state could tax the same activity of the
interstate business. If an activity taxed in one state could
also be taxed in another, an unapportioned tax on this activity
by any state would be struck down as being a possible multiple
burden on interstate commerce. In the first case in which it
spoke of multiple burdens, the Supreme Court upheld a state
gross receipts tax on the privilege of preparing, printing, and
publishing a magazine sold in interstate commerce. 10 Shortly
thereafter, the same court struck down a gross receipts tax on
the sales of a manufacturer who sold his goods in interstate
commerce. 1 The basis for this second decision was that other
states might levy a tax on the same sales, thus creating the
possibility of a double tax burden; this had not been possible
5. The sole exception is 73 Stat. 555 (1959), 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1963), in
which Congress forbid the states or subdivisions thereof to place a net income
tax upon income derived from a state where the only local activity was the solicita-
tion of orders.
6. Philadelphia & So. S.S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U.S. 326 (1887).
7. United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321 (1918).
8. Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
9. Western Livestock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
10. Ibid. In Western Livestock the court upheld a privilege tax on the business
of publishing a trade journal measured as 2% of the price at which the advertising
was sold. Although the magazine after being published moved in interstate
commerce, the court held the business of preparing, printing, and publishing
magazines is a local and distinct function apart from its circulation. Further,
the court held that the tax was in such "form and substance" as not to be capable
of being repeated by other states.
11. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1988).
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in the first case since the activities subjected to the tax-prepar-
ing, printing, and publishing a magazine-were exclusively
within the taxing state. The Court indicated in the second case
that the possibility of a double burden could have been avoided
if the taxing state had apportioned the tax to include only the
activities occurring in that state. The tax involved had been
levied by the state in which the sale had been made ("seller
state"), where the goods sold were to be delivered in another
state ("market state"). A similar tax was invalidated by the
Supreme Court the following year.12 The basis for these deci-
sions was that, under the multiple burden criterion, activity af-
fecting the interstate transaction would be taking place in other
states, allowing possible taxation by those other states.
It soon became clear that the Court would not recognize that
the same possibility of multiple burdens existed where a tax
was imposed on interstate commerce by the state of market,
when a two percent tax upon the delivery of possession by an
interstate seller was allowed.' "  In that case the court spoke
in terms of local incidents, a concept which has become very
important in the handling of commerce clause problems. Under
the "local incidents" approach the inquiry is whether there was
some local activity or incident upon which a state could levy a
tax. The courts have developed limits concerning what will be
considered a proper incident; a state may not tax an interstate
business whose only contact with the taxing state is solicitation
by traveling salesmen,'14 or which makes only an occasional
delivery to a customer within the taxing state. 15
At the same time the Court was developing the local in-
cident approach to sales and gross receipts taxes, it also began
to approve state requirements that interstate business must
collect use taxes imposed upon interstate transactions. 16 These
use taxes were approved in succeeding cases 7 without much
definite limitation until the Supreme Court established the rule
that in order to require an interstate seller to collect the local
use taxes there must be sufficient "nexus" between the seller
12. Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneyford, 305 U.S. 434 (1939).
13. McGoldrich v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940).
14. McLeod v. Dilworth, 322 U.S. 327 (1944).
15. Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887).
16. Henneyford y. Silias Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
17. General Trading Co. v. Tax Commission, 322 U.S. 335 (1944) ; Nelson v.
Sears Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941).
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and the collecting state."' Thus, as was true in sales and gross
receipts taxes, the collection of use taxes by an interstate seller
was dependent upon the existence of local incidents. The courts
did not apply the same standard of local incidents to use taxes
as it did to sales and gross receipts taxes; for example, "con-
tinuous solicitation" by salesmen within the state even when
they are independent agents has been held to be a sufficient
",nexus."19
The "incident" language has not been applied solely when
the Court handled state taxation of interstate commerce under
the commerce clause; the "local incidents" test is also important
in determining due process questions. Throughout the history
of state taxation of interstate commerce, there have been a
great number of cases decided on due process grounds rather
than on the basis of the commerce clause. The due process
clause requires that the limitation on the states' power to tax
is to be ascertained by reference to the right this particular
state has to tax the interstate business in question rather than
by reference to the ultimate effect such taxation might have upon
interstate commerce.
Whether a state tax violates the due process clause depends
upon whether the tax bears some fiscal relation to the protec-
tion, opportunities, and benefits given by the taxing state, in
other words, "whether the state has given anything for which
it can ask a return. ' 20 Under this standard the Court has
upheld a tax upon the payment of dividends 21 and a state un-
employment compensation fund tax.22  On the other hand, it
has been held a violation of due process for a state to levy a
corporation tax based upon the value of the corporation's
property within the state where only a fraction of its income
was derived from business done therein. 23 It has also been
held that a foreign corporation is not subject to a retailers'
occupation tax where the only contact with the state was promo-
tion, delivery of bids, transfer of title, and delivery of the
merchandise.2
4
18. Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954).
19. Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
20. Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940).
21. Ibid.
22. International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
23. Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123 (1931).




The due process clause does not preclude a state from placing
an excise tax on the proportion of the fair value of the capital
stock employed within the state even though it is engaged in
an interstate business 2 nor does it preclude a state from im-
posing a franchise tax based upon capital invested within the
state by an interstate corporation doing no local business, but
depending on the state for the protection of its property.26 The
Court has also held that where a state seeks to tax gross receipts
from interstate transactions consummated within its borders, its
power to do so cannot be withheld on constitutional grounds
when it treats wholly local transactions the same way.2 Finally,
in Norton v. Department of Revenue,2 the most recent case upon
which the Court relied, it came to a decision on due process
grounds, although giving some consideration to the interstate
commerce clause, which upheld an Illinois occupation tax on
retailers based on gross receipts as applied to sales that were
in any manner locally facilitated.
In the instant case, the majority began by recognizing the
general proposition that states may not tax the privilege of
engaging in interstate commerce. However, relying on dicta
in Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor,' 9 they found that
the proposition was not applicable here. The Court found that,
as in Spector, Washington was merely attempting to tax the
local activities of GM and, according to criteria adopted in the
Norton case, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer to show
that its activities within the taxing state are not such incidents
as the state can tax. Further, the Court found that in this case
it is not necessary that there be any office in the state through
which the local sales are channeled, thus refuting an idea emanat-
ing from previous cases that such a local office was necessary.30
25. Atlantic Lbr. Co. v. Commissioner of Corp. & Taxation, 298 U.S. 553
(1936).
26. Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80 (1948).
27. International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340
(1940).
28. 340 U.S. 534 (1951).
29. 340 U.S. 602 (1951). The dictum was to the effect that an in-state ac-
tivity may be a sufficient local incident upon which a tax may be based. There-
fore, such taxes may be imposed although their payment may come out of the
funds derived from interstate business, provided the taxes are imposed in such
a way as to be reasonably related to the powers of the state and are non-
discriminatory.
30. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450
(1959) ; Field Enterprises, Inc. v. Washington, 47 Wash. 2d 852, 289 P.2d
1010 (1955), aff'd, 352 U.S. 806 (1956).
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The Court felt that even in the absence of formal offices the
corporation effectively used the district managers working out
of their homes to serve the local purposes of the corporation.
The Court concluded that the bundle of corporate activities in
which General Motors was engaged in the State of Washington
were sufficient local incidents to form the basis of taxation.
The Court admitted that an unapportioned gross receipts
tax is necessarily suspect; but where there is "some definite
link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person,
property, or transaction it seeks to tax, ' 31 it may be constitu-
tionally permissible. Additionally, the Court found on the facts
presented that in this case, as in Norton, the corporation had
so mingled its admittedly taxable business with the business
it alleges was nontaxable that the state court's decision was
within the realm of permissible judgment.32
The Court then approached the question of multiple taxation.
GM claimed that some of its products were subject to a city
gross receipts tax in St. Louis and thus to dual taxation. 33
Relying on a previous decision, 34 the Court laid aside the question
as "not now before us" because the taxpayer did not satisfy the
burden of proving the state's tax burdened interstate com-
merce.35 The Court found that GM had not demonstrated there
was a definite burden upon interstate commerce in a consti-
tutional sense; GM had not proved that the St. Louis tax was
upon the identical interstate shipments used by Washington to
measure its tax, or further, that Oregon levied any tax on the
wholesale sales in question.
It is submitted that the majority opinion in the present case
was a proper one in its result and its basis in the due process
clause. Those dissenting do so on the theory that the tax is un-
31. 377 U.S. 436, 448 (1964).
32. Ibid. The Court went further to state that "although mere entry into a
state does not take from a corporation the right to continue to do an interstate
business with tax immunity, it does not follow that the corporation can channel
its operations through a maze of local connections as does General Motors, and
take advantage of its gain on domesticity, and still maintain that same degree
of immunity."
33. See American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459 (1919), which upheld
the city gross receipts tax subsequently applied to General Motors.
34. Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1945).
35. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450
(1959), which stated the rule that "in this type of case the taxpayers must
show that the formula places a burden upon interstate commerce in a constitu-
tional sense." Id. at 463.
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constitutional because it violates the commerce clause require-
ment of unhampered free trade among the states. 36
The majority passed over the interstate commerce question
as not before them because GM had failed to prove any definite
"multiple burden" upon the identical interstate shipments by
which Washington measured its tax. This enunciation by the
Court seems to depart from previous holdings37 which invalidated
state taxes where there was a "danger" or "risk" of multiple
taxation. It must be pointed out that the taxes which the
Court has struck down as posing a "danger" or "risk" of multiple
taxation were imposed by a seller state3s rather than the state
of market. The difference lies in the fact that when a seller
state imposes a tax on goods to be shipped into another state, it
is in effect shifting the burden of the tax on to the citizens
of the market state. However, where the tax is imposed by the
market state, as in the present case, the burden of the tax will
be on the citizens of the taxing market state. Doubtless, it
is as a result of this distinction that the Court has applied the
"risk" or "danger" test whenever the tax was imposed by the
seller state while imposing upon the taxpayer the burden of
proving injury in a constitutional sense whenever the tax is
imposed by the market state. It is submitted that the reason
for this distinction is that when the tax is imposed by the seller
state the purchaser in another state has no control over the
tax; on the other hand, when the tax is levied by the state of
market the purchaser has a remedy in the state political ma-
chinery.
In attempting to base its decision upon the due process clause
the Supreme Court examined the activities of GM within the
State of Washington and determined that this bundle of cor-
porate activities generated the wholesale sales which were
taxed.39 It further determined that the tax need not be appor-
tioned as the corporation failed to prove that these local activi-
ties were not the decisive factors in producing the taxed sales.
In making these determinations the Court was simply applying
36. See Justice Brennan's dissent, 377 U.S. at 450; and Justice Goldberg's
dissent, id. at 457.
37. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946) ; Gwin, White & Prince v. Hen-
neyford, 305 U.S. 434 (1939).
38. See cases cited note 37 supra; see also text accompanying note 12 8upra.
39. See the Washington Supreme Court's application of the tax in question
in Field Enterprises, Inc. v. Washington, 47 Wash. 2d 852, 289 P.2d 1010 (1955),
affd, 352 U.S. 806 (1956).
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the standard enunciated in Norton to the factual situations in
this case.
Mr. Justice Goldberg in his dissenting opinion states that
the Court went beyond its holding in the Norton decision. He
indicated that Norton would require immunity for all the Pon-
tiac and Oldsmobile sales and also for those sales of parts and
Chevrolets which were not connected with a Seattle warehouse
or office. But this argument ignores the fact that GM, through
its activities in Washington, has just as permanently established
itself in the state, as it would have through establishing a local
office as in the Norton case. It is also Justice Goldberg's belief
that the activities of GM's representatives were comparable to
the activities of itinerant drummers or traveling salesmen which
have been held immune from state taxation. 40 It is submitted
that this argument ignores the distinguishing facts that the
"district managers" were permanently established in the state
and were engaged in a broad range of activities to aid in the
stimulation of GM sales.
The Court in deciding this case properly directed its inquiry
toward determining whether the bundle of in-state activity of
the taxpayer which produced the sales was a sufficient con-
nection with Washington to support the tax. The Court should
have gone further, however, and related the tax to the protec-
tion, opportunities, and benefits given by the state levying the
tax. But until a final determination by Congress concerning
what state taxation of interstate commerce will be permissible,
the Supreme Court must decide the constitutionality of state
taxation of interstate commerce on a case-by-case basis. In
this case the Court was justified in upholding the tax.
Lawrence L. Jones
CRIMINAL LAW -IMPOSSIBLE ATTEMPTS"
A thief, captured with a stolen overcoat, cooperated with
Oklahoma police in entrapping the defendant by delivering the
coat to him. There was no question as to the defendant's intent
40. For cases relied on by Justice Goldberg, see McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth,
322 U.S. 327 (1944); Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489(1887).
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